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ESSAY: SETTING THE BASES OF A POLICY 
FRAMEWORK TO COVER OLD-AGE RISK 
 
Pablo Arellano Ortiz* 
 
This Essay proposes a coherent vision about the protection of 
old-age pensions and establishes a public policy strategy that  
allows the protection of a country’s entire population.  It  
attempts to connect the action of the State, through the notion of 
the welfare state, with the protection of pension systems.  It  
proposes three levels of protection: (1) the welfare state, (2) state 
regulation, and (3) pension scheme regulation.  The first Section 
of this Essay reviews welfare states, explains their categories, and 
discusses their protective effects.  The second Section  
examines how to structure the various pension schemes into a  
coherent pension system under a single protective logic,  
postulated after the Chilean Pension Reform of 2008.  Finally, the 
third Section explains how pension schemes provide pension  
coverage to a greater number of people. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Globalization and changes in labor markets have made the 
protection against old-age risk more complex.1  State action and 
private sector programs have become insufficient for the majority 
of the global population.2  To protect more effectively against this 
risk, it is necessary to reevaluate the current policies and  
strategies of income protection.3  A review of current day  
regulations should be evaluated on two levels: (1) the State and 
(2) the mechanisms of risk protection. 
The State viewpoint considers the different interactions  
between public and private actors involved in the program.4  
Thus, the notion that the welfare state plays a key role is an  
accurate statement, and a review showing its origin, evolution, 
and current problems is appropriate.5  This Essay analyzes classic 
and new classifications of protection schemes6 and examines the 
eventual export of this concept from developed countries to  
emerging regions.7 
Regarding the mechanisms of old-age risk protections, many 
countries have hybrid models of protection from old-age risk.8  
These hybrid models have also been categorized as “multi-pillar” 
 
1. Old-age risk is one of nine social classic risks covered by social security.  These 
nine risks were set in 1952 by ILO Convention no. 102.  C102 – Social Security  
(Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102), Int’l Lab. Org., 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTR
UMENT_ID:312247 [https://perma.cc/V6C8-74BS]. 
2. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS: DEVELOPMENT 
AND REFORM (Colin Gillion et al. eds., Int’l Lab. Office, 2000) [hereinafter SOCIAL 
SECURITY PENSIONS]. 
3. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, BUILDING DECENT SOCIETIES: RETHINKING 
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN STATE BUILDING (Peter Townsend, Geneva: Int’l Lab. 
Office, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
4. I will use my previous study on the subject.  PABLO ARELLANO ORTIZ, Estado de 
Bienestar: un sello europeo y su pretendida proyección mundial”, in Programa de Es-
tudios Europeos UDEC, in TENSIONES EN EUROPA: DESAFIOS PARA LA INTEGRACIÓN 89-
107 (RIL Editores, 2013). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Peter H. Lindert proposes this idea.  PETER H. LINDERT, Can the European Wel-
fare model be exported?, in BUILDING DECENT SOCIETIES: RETHINKING THE ROLE OF 
SOCIAL SECURITY IN STATE BUILDING (Peter Townsend, Geneva: Int’l Lab. Office,  
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
8. For a review of different models see ROBERT HOLZMAN & RICHARD HINZ, OLD 
AGE INCOME SUPPORT IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
PENSION SYSTEMS AND REFORM (World Bank Pub. 2005); WORLD BANK, AVERTING THE 
OLD AGE CRISIS: POLICIES TO PROTECT THE OLD AND PROMOTE GROWTH (World Bank, 
Oxford U. Press 1994); SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2. 
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models.9  However, these models often do not provide coverage for 
all populations.10  The coverage policy, to provide maximum  
protection, should be based under a single logic based on the  
capacity to contribute to the future beneficiaries.  While the  
protection of old-age risk is rooted in the basis of a single logic 
model based on contributory capacity, the compliance of the right 
to a pension with the principle of subjective universality is an  
unrealized quest in many countries.11  The two components of a 
social security system, non-contributory and contributory  
mechanisms, should be assessed by their overall ability to cover 
the entire population.12  The first component includes a State- 
provided non-contributory mechanism, which responds to  
international and constitutional obligations of protection for a 
population.13  The second component involves both mandatory 
and voluntary contributory mechanisms that enable people to  
obtain protection against old-age risk on their own accord.14  The 
blending of these two mechanisms characterizes the universal 
right to a pension.15 
Because the problem of aging is a global issue,16 it requires a 
global solution.  Accordingly, a successful public pension policy 
should consider three levels of protection: (1) the welfare state, (2) 
state regulation, and (3) pension scheme regulation.  As for the 
third level, in relation to protection regimes, many pension  
options should be considered,17 such as whether the mechanism is 
 
9. See HOLZMAN & HINZ, supra note 8; SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2, 
at 27. 
10. Pablo Arellano Ortiz, Marco de análisis del sistema de pensiones chileno 
después de la reforma de 2008, 19 REVISTA DE DERECHO 21, 21-43 (2012). 
11. See PABLO ARELLANO ORTIZ, LECCIONES DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL (Librotecnia 
2015). 
12. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43. 
13. PABLO ARELLANO ORTIZ, UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME DANS LE RÉGIME 
DES RETRAITES, L’EXEMPLE DU CHILI (L’Harmattan 2012) [hereinafter UNIVERSALISME 
ET INDIVIDUALISME]; PABLO ARELLANO ORTIZ, Universalism and Individualism in 
Chilean pension law: an example of extension of coverage for Eastern Europe, in 
LABOUR MARKETS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 
219-231 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2012) [hereinafter LABOUR MARKETS]. 
14. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13.  
15. Id. 
16. Social protection for older persons: key policy trends and statistics, INT’L LAB. 
ORG., http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/dgreports/dcomm/documents/  
publication/wcms_310211.pdf [https://perma.cc/QD66-FD5G] [hereinafter Social  
protection for older persons]. 
17. See Nicholas Barr, Economic theory and the welfare state: A survey and  
interpretation, 30 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 741, 741 (1992); Nicholas Barr & Peter  
Diamond, Reforma de pensiones, principios, errores analiticos y orientaciones politicas, 
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“pay-as-you-go” or “individual capitalization;” whether the  
administration is public or private; or whether it is financed 
through contributions, taxes, or a non-contributory mechanism.18  
 
62 REV. INTERNACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 5, 5-33 (2009); Nicholas Barr, Garantía 
de los derechos proporcionados por los regimenes de prestaciones privados,  
Investigaciones & Puntos de vista N° 10, Iniciativa de la AISS, enero, 2003 ; Nicholas 
Barr, La verdad sobre la reforma de pensiones, 26 ANÁLISIS LABORAL 24, 24-27 (2002); 
Nicholas Barr, La réforme des retraites: mythes, vérités et choix stratégiques, 55 REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DE SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE 3, 3-48 (2002); Esteban Calvo, Fabio M.  
Bertranou, & Evelina Bertranou, Are old-age pension system reforms moving away 
from individual retirement accounts in latin america?, 39 J. OF SOC. POL’Y 223, 223-
234 (2010); Fabio Bertranou, Esteban Calvo, & Elevina Bertranou, Is Latin America 
retreating from individual retirement accounts?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT 
BOSTON C., (2009), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/IB_9-14-508.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K3K8-DMJM]; ROBERT HOLZMANN & ROBERT PALACIOS, Les comptes 
individuels en tant qu’assurance sociale : une perspective de la Banque Mondiale, in 
CONSTRUIRE LA SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE: LA PRIVATISATION EN QUESTION 61-80 (Xenia 
Scheil-Adlung, P. Lang 2002); Estelle James, New systems for old age security. Theory, 
practice, and empirical evidence, THE WORLD BANK POL’Y RES. DEP’T POVERTY AND 
HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION, (1997), http://documents.worldbank.org/cu-
rated/en/695471468739536790/pdf/multi0page.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH8U-T7PG]; 
SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2; Katharina Müller, Contested universalism: 
from Bonosolto Renta Dignidad in Bolivia, 18 INT’L J. OF SOC. WELFARE 163 (2008); 
Mitchell A. Orenstein, La crisis de la privatización de las pensiones: ¿desaparición o 
resurgimiento de una tendencia política global?, 64 REV. INTERNACIONAL DE 
SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 73, 73-90 (2011); INT’L LAB. ORG., PENSIONES EN AMÉRICA LATINA. 
DOS DÉCADAS DE REFORMA, GINEBRA (Int’l Lab. Office 1998); INT’L LAB. ORG., 
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SECURITY (Int’l Lab. Office 1984); Monika Queisser, Après le 
Chili, les réformes de la deuxième génération en Amérique Latine, 48 REVUE  
INTERNATIONALE DE SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE 27, 27-45 (1995).  
18. For a better understanding of this concepts it should be consider under the 
terminology set by professors Nicholas Barr and Peter Diamond, as follows: A  
“contributory basic pension” is a pension paid, often at a flat rate, to a person with a 
full record of contributions, or pro rata to a person with an incomplete contributions 
record.  A “defined-benefit (DB) pension” is a pension in which the benefit is  
determined as a function of the worker’s history of pensionable earnings.  The formula 
may be based on the worker’s final wage and length of service, or on wages over a 
longer period, for example, the worker’s full career.  A DB system may be fully or  
partially funded, or unfunded.  In a pure DB arrangement, the sponsor’s contributions 
are adjusted to meet obligations.  Insofar as the degree of funding is maintained,  
contributions are adjusted to meet anticipated obligations; thus, the risk of varying 
rates of return to pension assets falls on the sponsor.  A defined-contribution (DC) 
pension” is a pension in which the benefit is determined by the value of assets  
accumulated toward a person’s pension.  Benefits may be taken as a lump sum, as a  
sequence of withdrawals, or by purchase of an annuity.  The expected discounted value 
of benefits is equal to the value of assets, referred to as benefits being determined 
actuarially.  Thus, a pure DC plan adjusts obligations to match available funds, so that 
the individual bears the portfolio risk.  “Fully-funded pensions” pay all benefits from 
accumulated funds.  “Partially- funded pensions” pay benefits both from accumulated 
assets and from current contributions.  A noncontributory universal pension is based 
on years of residence.  “Notional defined-contribution (NDC) pensions” are financed on 
a pay-as-you-go or partially-funded basis, with a person’s pension bearing a quasi- 
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All these components aim to answer the same question: how can 
we protect old-age income security?19  The decision to implement 
a program by one feature or another is often based on ideological 
and political rationales rather than technical issues.20  This Essay 
does not develop these themes, but instead, analyzes the higher 
levels of rationale for the public policy decision-making side of the 
programs. 
Additionally, this Essay does not refer to the different types 
of pension reform programs, such as a parametric reform were the 
formula is adjusted, or a structural reform in which scheme is 
changed for another.21  Alternatively, this Essay focuses on a  
vision for a system providing old-age protection.  In this vision, to 
meet the objective universal old-age protection standard, it is  
necessary to design a system that contains multiple elements.22  
This approach allows for better reflection on the history of pension 
protection to develop a current system for current times.23  A  
policy framework that considers all actors and all mechanisms 
will be more successful in extending universal coverage.24  Under 
 
actuarial relationship to his or her lifetime pension contributions.  “Pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) pensions” are paid out of current revenue (usually by the state, from tax  
revenue) rather than out of accumulated funds.  Partially-funded pensions are often 
referred to as PAYG.  Barr & Diamond, supra note 17.  For an explanation of non-
contributory mechanisms see Pensiones no contributivas y asistenciales, INT’L LAB. 
ORG. (2002), http://interactions.eldis.org/sites/interactions.eldis.org/files/database_sp/ 
Chile/Pensiones%20Asistenciales%20(PASIS)/asocfile.pdf [https://perma.cc/VA6S-
8ZSL]. 
19. PABLO ARELLANO ORTIZ, RETO ACTUAL DE LAS PENSIONES DE VEJEZ: ¿FIN DE 
LAS AFP? ¿REGRESO A REPARTO? (Librotecnia 2015). 
20. Id. 
21. See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Reversing pension privatization: the experience of  
Argentina, Bolivia, Chile and Hungary, INT’L LAB. OFFICE, GENEVA (2014), 
http://www.ilo.org/gimi/gess/RessourcePDF.action?ressource.ressourceId=43277 
[https://perma.cc/SH3R-XETG]; CARMELO MESA-LAGO, Lecciones y desafíos de 23 años 
de reformas estructurales de pensiones en América Latina, in EL SISTEMA DE PENSIONES 
EN CHILE EN EL CONTEXTO MUNDIAL Y DE AMÉRICA LATINA: EVALUACIÓN Y DESAFÍOS, 
PONENCIAS DEL SEMINARIO INTERNACIONAL 45 (Int’l Lab. Org. 2004); Carmelo Mesa-
Lago, Política y reforma de la seguridad social en América latina, 160 NUEVA 
SOCIEDAD 133 (1999), available at http://nuso.org/media/articles/down-
loads/2757_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5ZN-JPAY]. 
22. See Social protection for older persons, supra note 17; Robert L. Brown,  
Criteria for the optimal design of a social security retirement system, 2 INT’L J. OF SOC. 
SECURITY AND WORKERS COMP. 79, 79-90 (2010). 
23. See Social protection for older persons, supra note 17; ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra 
note 19. 
24. This trend on extension of coverage can be seen in ILO documents.  E.g.,  
Extending social security to all: A guide through challenges and options, INT’L LAB. 
ORG. (2010), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@ 
publ/documents/publication/wcms_146616.pdf [https://perma.cc/39DN-W55G]  
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this framework, the retirement system would become a coherent 
whole, combining elements of universalism and individualism, to 
protect the entire population through a system that has only one 
logic.25 
II. WELFARE STATE: CONCEPTS AND CATEGORIES 
The concept of the welfare state is relatively new26 and is  
attributed to Robert Titmuss, who in the 1950s, developed a series 
of studies examining the actions of protective policies of social 
risks.27  Over time, the concept of a “welfare society” developed to 
refer to a similar, or very closely related, framework of protection.  
The concept of a welfare society ignores the protection from the 
state and analyzes how a society evolves and protects at an  
individual level.  This framework has two elements: (1) a judicial 
element, mainly based on the legal protection of human rights, 
and (2) an economic element.28 
In addition to these two concepts, the concept of “state  
protection” became important after World War II,29 particularly 
during the “30 Glorious,” which refers to the thirty-year period 
following World War II, also characterized as Europe’s  
“reconstruction period”.30  Subsequently, during the 1980s and 
1990s, questions and reflections arose on the utility of a welfare 
state.31  The concept is not well received unanimously and has 
been a great topic of debate in Europe as well as other regions.32 
 
[hereinafter Extending social security]; Tripartite Meeting of Experts on Strategies for 
the Extension of Social Security Coverage, INT’L LAB. ORG. (2009), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_protect/-soc_sec/documents/ 
publication/wcms_secsoc_14323.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8ZM-WW8B] [hereinafter  
Tripartite Meeting]. 
25. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13. 
26. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 89-107.  
27. RICHARD M. TITMUSS, ESSAYS ON “THE WELFARE STATE” (Allen & Unwin,  
Londres, 3d ed. 1976).  For others, the expression was first used by William Temple 
and even by Bismarck.  See Luis Enrique de la Villa Gil, ¿Qué es eso del Estado del 
Bienestar y cómo se mide, histórica y económicamente?, 3 REV. DERECHO SOCIAL Y 
EMPRESA 15, 19 (2015). 
28. de la Villa Gil, supra note 28, at 18-21. 
29. JEAN-JACQUES DUPEYROUX, MICHEL BORGETTO, & ROBERT LAFORE, DROIT DE 
LA SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE (Dalloz, 16 ed. 2015). 
30. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 89-107.  
31. Id. 
32. E.g., FRANÇOIS-XAVIER MERRIEN, RAPHAËL PARCHET & ANTOINE KERNEN, 
L’ETAT SOCIAL: UNE PERSPECTIVE INTERNATIONALE (Armand Colin 2005); PIERRE 
ROSANVALLON, LA CRISE DE L’ÉTAT PROVIDENCE (Seuil 1981); Isabella Mares, Les 
conséquences de l’Etat providence pour l’économie, 60 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE 
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In a welfare state model, the State takes an active role in 
protecting its population against the social risks of old-age income 
insecurity.33  The sociologist Gosta Esping-Andersen proposes a 
classification of three different forms of a welfare state.34  The first 
is a liberal welfare state (as seen in the United States, Canada, 
Australia), in which the assistance is based on a needs  
assessment, modest universal transfers, and predominately social 
insurance plans. The second form is a social democratic welfare 
state (as seen in Northern Europe), in which there is a dualism 
between the State and market, the working class and the middle 
class, and those seeking equality at a high level instead of a low 
level.  Thirdly, Esping-Andersen proposed a corporatist welfare 
state (as seen in Germany, Italy, France), in which the program 
is strongly linked to the government where the liberal obsession 
with the market and market performance is never prominent.  
These classifications are differentiated by three characteristics: 
(1) the role of the state, (2) public or private financing of benefits, 
and (3) the role of the private sector.35  However, Esping- 
Andersen’s classifications only take into account countries where 
the State has an established and sustainable social security  
system.36  These classifications can be utilized in southern  
hemisphere countries and even more so in non-western countries 
where welfare states have not been identified.37  This concept has 
not been fully developed, and exporting the European model may 
be difficult to effectuate.38 
On the other hand, new categories of welfare states have  
replaced Esping-Andersen’s classic-style categories in Europe  
today.39  Other authors have proposed five new and more  
 
SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE 71 (2007); Christophe Ramaux, Quelle théorie pour l’Etat social? 
Apports et limites de la référence assurantielle, 1 REVUE FRANÇAISE DES AFFAIRES 
SOCIALES 13 (2007). 
33. GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSON, LES TROIS MONDES DE L’ETAT-PROVIDENCE (Presses 
Universitaires de France 1999). 
34. Id.; See also GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSON, The sustainability of welfare states 
into the 21st century, in GLOBALIZATION AND WELFARE: A CRITICAL READER 50-60 (Ritu 
Vij, Palgrave Macmillan 2007); GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSON & BRUNO PALIER, TROIS 
LEÇONS SUR L’ETAT-PROVIDENCE (Seuil 2008).  For critics to this classification see 
MERRIEN, PARCHET & KERNEN, supra note 32; ROSANVALLON, supra note 32. 
35. ESPING-ANDERSON, supra note 34.  
36. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 89-107. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. YURI KAZEPOV & STEFANIA SABATINELLI, Los ingresos mínimos y la  
integración social: Disposiciones institucionales en Europa, in PROTECCIÓN E 
INCLUSIÓN SOCIAL: EXPERIENCIAS Y POLÍTICAS 79-107 (Int’l Lab. Org. 2008), available 
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expansive categories of welfare states, including: (1) the liberal 
welfare state; (2) the social democrat welfare state; (3) the  
corporatist welfare state; (4) the family-based system; and (5) the 
transition model.40 
The liberal welfare state (as seen in the United States and 
the United Kingdom), in which the State is in charge of social  
welfare, is seen as a relatively residual system where intervention 
occurs only when neither the market nor the family have  
managed to allocate resources.  The market is the prevailing 
mechanism of regulation and integration in a highly  
individualized and competitive society.  Next, the social democrat 
welfare state (as seen in Denmark), in which social welfare by the 
State is omnipresent, assumes the responsibilities of the family 
and the market where benefits are universally and generally  
applied to all citizens according to their needs.  Thirdly, the  
corporatist welfare state is one in which the State provides social 
welfare conceived in a meritocratic way. 
These first three regimes reproduce the socioeconomic range, 
reaching families in the labor market in accordance with the  
position of the head(s) of the household, which mirrors their work. 
The family is the predominant social entity, and accordingly  
receives strong support from state benefits in kind and cash.   
Market dependence is higher in the corporatist model than in the 
social democratic model, but lower than in the liberal model. 
Like the corporatist model, the family-based system (as seen 
in Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece) is meritocratic and  
fragmented, but is less generous and very unbalanced in granting 
benefits in services and in kind.  Far fewer resources are allocated 
to family policies (passive subsidiarity), to other contributory  
regimes, and to regimes verifying economic resources.  The  
consequence is that families are overloaded with social care  
responsibilities receiving little to no resources from the State. The 
transition model (as seen in Central and Eastern Europe) is not 
yet a fully-developed, consolidated model possessing its own  
characteristics.  The institutional framework to counter the  
conditions that produce vulnerability has undergone a radical 
change since 1989.  The transition model’s contents depend on the 
culture of each country. 
A recent study attempted to analyze whether this five- 
category European welfare state model can be exported to  
 
at http://staging.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2006/106B09_338_span.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
AT6J-CQG3]. 
40. Id. 
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developing countries.41  To this end, the study decided to simplify 
the term “welfare state,” defining it as: when a country devotes 
20% or more of gross domestic product (GDP) to social  
transfers/benefits.42  The study shows that developing countries 
today spend more on social transfers than advanced Organization 
for Cooperation and Development (OCD) countries.43  Countries 
such as Uruguay, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico meet advanced levels 
of high spending,44 but it is not certain whether these countries 
have a model comparable to the European welfare state model.  A  
country’s GDP spending figure may be useful for comparing  
different needs of different cultures.  However, a study that only 
uses GDP as the benchmark oversimplifies the problem.45 
While the study can be criticized for its analysis method, the 
author succeeds on the assertion that the European welfare state 
model hardly emulates developing countries.46  Moreover, the fact 
that the welfare state model remains important in Europe and 
continues to help stabilize society, remains a strong argument for 
those who attempt to demonstrate its usefulness for welfare 
states in the developing world.47 
In regions such as Latin America, Eastern Europe, China, 
and India, where the majority of the population is excluded from 
welfare state classifications, the European concept of the welfare 
state seems to fit, for various reasons, within national order.48  It 
is precisely in these countries where extension policies are most 
needed.49  It should be necessary to open the concept of welfare 
state to new cultures and stop considering it as a term that  
exclusively refers to European systems of social protection.50  The 
idea of a State as the guarantor of protection must be adopted in 
cultures outside the western world to include characteristics of 
other regions’ labor markets.51  Nevertheless, the debate  
 
41. LINDERT, supra note 7; but see de la Villa Gil, supra note 28, at 63 (In a similar 
sense, it can be criticized.). 
42. LINDERT, supra note 7. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 89-107. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. For a view of the Latin American context see Andres Uthoff, Brechas del  
Estado de bienestar y reformas de pensiones en América Latina, 89 REV. CEPAL 9, 9-
37 (2006). 
49. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 4, at 89-107. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
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surrounding the concept will keep intellectuals and scholars  
occupied for a long time.  Some welfare state characteristics are 
the result of a long evolution: the combination of different  
mechanisms and different actors, and the development of a  
relationship between the mechanisms and actors.52 
III. A POLICY BASED ON THE CONTRIBUTORY CAPACITY 
The second level of protection postulates the coordination of 
a protection policy for old-age risk. This policy must consider the 
various regimes with a systemic view of what is to be protected 
before examining each particular regime.53  Accordingly, various 
reports analyze the protection of old-age risk as a protective  
system.54 
At present, the strategies to cover the population have  
different characteristics but their objectives are the same: to  
provide pension coverage during old age.55  They often consist of 
models based on the idea of “pillars of protection.”56  The image of 
a pillar evokes the vision of columns supporting a building.57  
However, the current definition in social security protection  
embodies a more complex vision than a mere vertical support of a 
building.58  We often talk about multi-pillar systems of protection 
as a set of different protection mechanisms: differentiated  
coverage, “pay-as-you-go,” and capitalization.59  Thus, the multi-
pillar model of social protection is illustrated as a multi-story 
building (vertical coverage), which provides different forms of  
coverage to diverse groups of the population (horizontal  
 
52. ESPING-ANDERSON, supra note 34. 
53. Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43. 
54. Florencia Aníta & Arnaldo Provasi Lanzara, La multipilarización de los  
sistemas previsionales en el escenario posreforma: Chile, Uruguay y Brasil, 64 REV. 
INTERNACIONAL DE SEGURIDAD SOCIAL 63, 63-82; Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43; 
LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 13; ESTELLE JAMES, Los tres – o cuatro? – pilares de un 
sistema previsional, in EL FORTALECIMIENTO DE LOS NUEVOS SISTEMAS PREVISIONALES: 
EL ROL DE CADA PILAR EN LA SOLUCIÓN DEL PROBLEMA DE LAS PENSIONES 37 (Editado 
por CIEDESS 2005); ESTELLE JAMES, THE WORLD BANK’S THREE-PILLAR SYSTEM: WILL 
IT PROVIDE INCOME SECURITY TO THE WORLD’S AGING POPULATION? (Am. Inst. for  
Contemp. German Stud. 1997).  
55. E.g., HOLZMAN & HINZ, supra note 9; SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 
2. 
56. E.g., HOLZMAN & HINZ, supra note 9; WORLD BANK, supra note 9; SOCIAL 
SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2.  
57. For example, the construction of the European Law model. 
58. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13.  
59. E.g., WORLD BANK, supra note 9; SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2. 
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coverage).60  The image of a pillar as a vertical structure may be 
inappropriate when referring to pension systems.61  To evaluate 
the coverage of pension systems in the context of the aging crisis, 
the World Bank62 and the International Labor Organization 
(ILO)63 have proposed two models of multi-pillar coverage.   
However, a more expansive view is needed, such as the one  
implemented after the Chilean Pension Reform of 2008.64  An  
explanation of this systemic view will follow the discussion of the 
Chilean system examples. 
Since the reform in 2008, the Chilean system has moved 
away from the multi-pillar model and towards a single-pillar 
model with two components: one contributory component, such as 
contributions to individual savings accounts,65 and one non- 
 
60. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43; UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, 
supra note 13. 
61. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43. 
62. The World Bank multi-pillar model is a combination of five elements: (1) a 
noncontributory, or “zero pillar,” (in the form of a demogrant or social pension) that 
provides a minimal level of protection; (2) a “first-pillar” contributory system that is 
linked to varying degrees of earnings and seeks to replace some portion of income; (3) 
a mandatory “second pillar” that is essentially an individual savings account; (4)  
voluntary “third-pillar” arrangements that can take many forms, (individual,  
employer sponsored, defined benefit, defined contribution) but are essentially flexible 
and discretionary in nature; and (5) informal intrafamily or intergenerational sources 
of both financial and nonfinancial support to the elderly, including access to health 
care and housing.  HOLZMAN & HINZ, supra note 9, at 42.  See also WORLD BANK, supra 
note 9; Lucy Roberts, La retraite entre épargne individuelle et assistance: la recette de 
la Banque mondiale, 48 Chronique Internationale de l’IRES 1 (1997); James, supra 
note 17; James, supra note 56; Estelle James, Fournir une meilleure protection et  
faciliter la croissance: argument en faveur du rapport La crise du vieillissement, 49 
REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SÉCURITÉ SOCIALE 3 (1996); Estelle James, Réforme des 
retraites. Comment parer à la crise du vieillessement, 32 FINANCES & DÉVELOPPEMENT 
4 (1995).  
63. The ILO model is based on four pillars: (1) a bottom anti-poverty tier of means 
tested benefits, and financed from general revenues, which provide income support for 
those without others means; (2) a second pay-as-you-go defined benefit tier, mandatory 
and publicly managed, which would provide a moderate replacement rate (say around 
40 or 50 per cent of lifetime average earnings) for all those who has contributed to it, 
and which would be fully indexed; (3) a third tier, which would be defined contribution 
based, mandatory up to a determined ceiling, possibly managed by private pension 
agencies, and which would provide a pension by means of annuities; and (4) fourth 
tier, which would be defined contribution based, voluntary, without ceiling and also 
managed by private pension agencies.  SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2. 
64. For the origins of the reform see Alberto Arenas de Mesa, Historia de la 
Reforma Previsional Chilena, INT’L LAB. ORG. (2010), http://www.ilo.org/ 
wcmsp5/groups/public/—-americas/—-ro-lima/—-sro-santiago/documents/publication/ 
wcms_178562.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CWP-TD28]. 
65. Regarding individual accounts see HOLZMANN & PALACIOS, supra note 17, at 
61-80. 
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contributory component, funded from taxation, resulting from the 
recent integration of “solidarity pensions.”66  The contributions  
accrue from a compulsory system,67 which has increased the  
disparities in pension benefits between different social classes of 
citizens.68  These disparities, along with the increasingly  
precarious nature of employment as a result of globalization and 
the rise in the informal sector, make the establishment of a  
universal retirement benefit essential.69 
The multi-pillar system provides different levels of coverage, 
which are represented as several pillars in a horizontal position.70  
This scheme can have as many levels as the model considers  
pillars.71  For example, the system can focus on a basic pillar, such 
as “pay-as-you-go,” another pillar consisting of defined  
contributions, and still another consisting of defined benefits.72  
However, none of these pillars alone provide universal coverage.  
Furthermore, each pillar provides just one type of coverage  
limited to a worker’s salary.  In general, it can be argued that a 
horizontal multi-pillar system does not fulfill the principle of  
subjective universality.73 
Some scholars argue that this reform introduces a pillar of 
solidarity.74  However, this solidarity is different than the  
solidarity in Europe’s public pension systems.75  Both the World 
Bank and the ILO have proposed a multi-pillar model utilizing a 
 
66. Before the 2008 reform, the regime consisted of two parts, contributory and 
non-contributory.  See Hugo Cifuentes Lillo, Características generales del Sistema de 
Seguridad Social Chileno, I Parte, REV. LABORAL CHILENA 62 (2005); HUGO 
CIFUENTES LILLO, PABLO ARELLANO ORTIZ & FRANCISCO WALKER ERRÁZURIZ, 
SEGURIDAD SOCIAL: PARTE GENERAL Y PENSIONES (Librotecnia 2013); ARELLANO 
ORTIZ, supra note 11. 
67. For an explanation of the contributory mechanism see Colin Gillion & 
Alejandro Bonilla, La privatización de un régimen nacional de pensiones: El caso 
chileno, 111 REV. INTERNACIONAL DEL TRABAJO 193, 193-221 (1998). 
68. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 19. 
69. In this sense, I have published Ortiz, supra note 19.  See also La protección 
social de cara al futuro: acceso, financiamiento y solidaridad, COMISIÓN ECONÓMICA 
PARA AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE (CEPLAC) (2006), http://repositorio.cepal.org/bit-
stream/handle/11362/2808/S2006004_es.pdf?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/MT59-
5FQZ]; Uthoff, supra note 48, at 9; Daniel Tielman & Andres Uthoff, El papel del 
aseguramiento en la protección social, 81 REV. DE LA CEPAL 103 (2003). 
70. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. The official position of the government when the law came into force.  
75. See Social protection for older persons, supra note 17; SOCIAL SECURITY 
PENSIONS, supra note 2. 
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“basic pillar,” or “pillar zero,” as the foundation to a system for 
old-age protection as a way to protect the most vulnerable part of 
the population.76  In this protection regime, each “pillar” supports  
a different logic and covers a different class of the population.77 
The idea of protecting a population in a precarious situation 
is the basis of Chilean solidarity pensions.78  The Chilean pension 
system utilizes a single-pillar model, based on an individual’s 
ability to save.79  The State projects the benefits as a form of  
solidarity and the benefits are only paid in the case of partial or 
total inability to save for retirement.80  Thus, in the Chilean  
system, the transition from one mechanism to another depends on 
an individual’s ability to save throughout his life.81  The essence 
of the Chilean system is the ability to save individually, which 
 
76. E.g., HOLZMAN & HINZ, supra note 9; WORLD BANK, supra note 9; SOCIAL 
SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2, at 27. 
77. Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43. 
78. A presidential commission that analyzed the old-age coverage and proposed 
changes that were adopted later in the pension reform in 2008.  The commission  
published the report as Consejo Asesor Presidencial para la Reforma Previsional, El 
Derecho a una vida digna en la vejez, hacia un Contrato Social con la Previsión en 
Chile. Volumen I, Diagnóstico y Propuestas de Reforma, Santiago (2006) [hereinafter 
El Derecho a una vida digna], https://www.sbif.cl/sbifweb/servlet/ 
Ebook?CTR=XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX&ID_EBOOK=L3252&position=1.   This can be 
also be noted in the region.  See Mesa-Lago, supra note 21.  It can also be found in 
several ILO documents where it can be identified the lack of coverage de juere or de 
facto.  See, e.g., Int’l Lab. Org. Advisory Group, Social Protection Floor for a Fair and 
Inclusive Globalization, INT’L LAB. ORG. (2011), http://www.ilo.org/ 
wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/publication/wcms_165 
750.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4HV-YW8G]; General Survey concerning social security in-
struments in light of the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, 
INT’L LAB. ORG. (2011), http://ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_norm/-relconf/docu-
ments/meetingdocument/wcms_152602.pdf [https://perma.cc/URH2-2D9B]; Social  
security for social justice and a fair globalization, INT’L LAB. ORG. (2011) 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdoc-
ument/wcms_152819.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3VG-UYW8]; Extending social  
security, supra note 24; Reunión tripartite, supra note 24; Recovering from the Crisis: 
A Global Jobs Impact, INT’L LAB. ORG. (2009), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/pub-
lic/—-ed_norm/—-relconf/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_108456.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4C24-2R6Q]; Setting Social Security Standards in a Global Society, 
INT’L LAB. ORG. (2008) http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-ed_protect/ 
-soc_sec/documents/publication/wcms_secsoc_5953.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8SP-DGJX].  
All these efforts led to the approval of a new ILO instrument on social security, but 
this time concerning social protection.  See R202 – Social Protection Floors  
Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202), INT’L LAB. ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_INSTR
UMENT_ID:3065524 [https://perma.cc/4CNK-BNRB].  
79. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13.  
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
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determines whether the State’s intervention is total, partial, or 
unneeded.82 
To clarify the framework of the Chilean system, reference 
should be made to fundamental legal principles83 essential for 
Chilean social security.84  Chilean law and the social security  
doctrine recognize these principles, but there is no unanimous 
agreement about their application to the Chilean system.85   
However, the Chilean social security system has adopted the  
principles of universality, solidarity, comprehensiveness,  
efficiency, consistency, and subsidiarity. 86  For the purposes of the 
present study, an in-depth analysis of the principle of universality 
is provided.  This principle can be understood in terms of  
“objective universality,” according to which all social  
contingencies are covered.87  The concept can also be understood 
in terms of “subjective universality,” according to which all  
citizens or residents must be protected.88  The entire population 
is covered, but coverage is achieved by means of minimum  
benefits.89  For example, Chile has opted for “subjective  
universality” where the entire population is covered, but coverage 
is subject to conditions for obtaining basic benefits.90  The  
principle of “subjective universality” in Chile is the result of a 
combination of public and private mechanisms, all based on the 
ability to save.91  The analysis of pension rights necessarily  
includes an analysis of the entire pension system and not just  
pension fund mechanisms.92 
 
82. Id. 
83. RUTH GABRIELA LANATA FUENZALIDA, MANUAL DE LEGISLACIÓN 
PREVISIONAL 9 (Universidad de Concepción Departamento de Derecho Laboral, 2d 
ed. 2000). 
84. Id. 
85. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13.  
86. On social security principles see ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 11; Ricardo  
Hormazabal, El sistema de AFP chileno: una visión critica, 9 REV. CHILENA DE 
ADMINISTRACIÓN PUBLICA 121, 123 (2007); FUENZALIDA, supra note 84, at 9; Juan  
Sebastian Gumucio Rivas, De reparto a capitalización: la experiencia chilena, II Parte, 
12 REV. LABORAL CHILENA 62, 66-74 (1996); SALVADOR VALDÉS-PRIETO, POLÍTICAS Y 
MERCADOS DE PENSIONES: UN TEXTO UNIVERSITARIO PARA AMÉRICA LATINA 36  
(Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile, 1st ed. 2002). 
87. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 11. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. For my view on this principle see ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 11; Hugo 
Cifuentes Lillo, Características generales del Sistema de Seguridad Social Chileno: I 
Parte, 136 REV. LABORAL CHILENA 61, 61-69 (2005). 
91. ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 19. 
92. Id. 
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Traditionally, the World Bank has classified the Chilean  
system of pension funds as a system that fits within the  
multi-pillar structure devised.93  However, following the reform in 
2008, this classification is no longer appropriate.94  On one hand, 
elements of the Chilean pension model appear to fit easily into a 
multi-pillar structure in which “pillar zero” is the non- 
contributory pension (that may benefit 60% of the population).  
The first pillar is mandatory capitalization and the second pillar 
consists of individual and collective voluntary contributions.  
However, it should be emphasized that they are voluntary and 
complementary to the mandatory pillar.95  On the other hand, it 
may be argued that the Chilean system no longer adopts the 
framework of a multi-pillar model, but instead constitutes a  
single-pillar model.96  While there are different mechanisms (non-
contributory, mandatory contributions, and voluntary  
contributions), the Chilean pension system is based on a  
single-pillar model fundamental principle: the ability to save  
individually.97  This ability determines the mechanism applicable 
to a particular case, so an individual without the ability to save 
will receive a solidarity (non-contributory) pension, an individual 
with a limited ability to pay will receive a solidarity-based top-up 
benefit, and an individual who has a significant ability to make 
voluntary contributions will be entitled to a contributory  
pension.98 
The articulation of these mechanisms in a single-pillar 
model, along with the coherent character, can be graphed as  
follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93. This is the view of the public administration, for more details see 
http://www.spensiones.cl [https://perma.cc/ZLU5-3GMY]. 
94. Arellano Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43. 
95. Id. 
96. For more details on this opinion see UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra 
note 13; Pablo Arellano Ortiz, El pilar solidario, la solución esperada para nuestro 
sistema de AFP, 164 REV. LABORAL CHILENA 86, 86-88 (2008). 
97. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13. 
98. Id. 
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Source: Arellano Ortiz (2012). 
IV. FINAL REMARKS 
The analysis in this Essay proposes a postulate to design  
protection against old-age risk to provide better coherence to the  
social security system.99  It extends coverage to those not included 
under a social insurance mechanism based in a right-based  
approach.100  The example of the Chilean pension system  
demonstrates that a multi-pillar model is no longer the only way 
to analyze a pension system.101  Additionally, the Chilean pension  
system provides the elements necessary to meet the international  
social security standards laid out by the ILO.102  Viewing the  
coverage as a single concept provides an understanding of today’s 
 
99.  Arellano Ortiz, supra note 10, at 21-43. 
100. This type of extension is what the ILO calls a “horizontal extension,” and it 
is part of the staircase approach promoted by the ILO.  See Tripartite Meeting, supra 
note 25, at 18.  
101. LABOUR MARKETS, supra note 13, at 219-31. 
102. I propose this in ARELLANO ORTIZ, supra note 11.  See also Juan Sebastián 
Gumucio Rivas, (2009) Descripción del sistema chileno de seguridad social desde la 
perspectiva del Convenio Núm 102 de 1952 de OIT, 8 REV. LATINOAMERICANA DE 
DERECHO SOCIAL 131,131-70 (2009). 
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pension problems as a whole.103  Pensions should incorporate the 
realities of all the population and not focus solely on  
contributions.104  The solution should also consider the evolution of 
the welfare states under internal and external factors in the present 
time.  In relation to old-age risk, the solution should also consider the 
coherent approach that this paper presents.  A useful welfare state 
outside Europe is one that can be adapted to the social security 
 culture where it is applied. 
 
 
 
103. UNIVERSALISME ET INDIVIDUALISME, supra note 13.  
104. E.g., SOCIAL SECURITY PENSIONS, supra note 2; El derecho a una vida  
digna, supra note 78. 
